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"[J]ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The
concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are
to keep the balance true."1
In order to keep a true balance, justice for the accuser may include the
right to tell the criminal story from a victim's unique perspective. This story
may include the consequences that a crime has had on the victim or the victim's
family. This sought-after right-in capital offense cases-is tempered by the
U.S. Constitution, as victims' comments could lead to the imposition of the
death penalty in capital offense trials solely because the jury was inflamed.2
Whether the state should constitutionally be allowed to impose the death
penalty against its citizenry is at the forefront of many legal disputes on the
question of penalties. Such disputes are further complicated when the law itself
is uncertain, either due to unclear language or continuous enacting, amending,
or repealing of statutes in a particular area of law. This uncertainty exists with
regard to Amended Substitute Senate Bill 186 (hereinafter Victims' Rights
Act).3
The Victims' Rights Act mandates that a victim of crime be permitted to
make a victim impact statement (hereinafter VIS) at several points in the
criminal justice process. VISs can be made during presentence investigations, 4
sentencing,5 parole,6 and furlough hearings. 7 The primary focus of this Note
shall be the statutory requirement that the courts must allow the victim of a
crime to make a VIS just before the imposition of a sentence, and that the VIS
1 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (Justice Cardozo's view was
reaffirmed in Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991)).
2 cregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976). A jury's discretion to impose the
ultimate penalty of death must be "suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action." Id. The Gregg Court recognized the mandates
established in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), regarding death
sentencing. Id.
3 S. 186, 120th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1994).
4 OMoREv. CODEANN. § 2930.13(B) (Baldwin 1994).
5 Id. § 2930.14(A).
6 Id. § 2967.12(BX1).
7 Id. § 2967.27(A)(2).
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must be considered in sentencing. 8 The VIS may include a description of the
effects of the crime on the victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime,
and the manner in which the crime was committed. 9 VISs do not unfairly
prejudice defendants in noncapital criminal sentencing hearings because
impartial and experienced judges impose sentences. However, VISs may be
more likely to have unfair and adverse effects in capital offense sentencing
hearings because these hearings are heard by juries'0 that recommend either life
imprisonment or the death penalty.11 VISs have the potential to seriously affect
8 Id. § 2930.14. This section states:
(A) Before imposing sentence upon the defendant for the commission of a crime,
the court shall perit the victim of the crime to make a statement concerning the effects
of the crime upon the victim, the circumstances surrounding the crime, and the manner
in which the crime was perpetrated. At the judge's option, the victim may present the
statement in writing prior to the sentencing hearing, orally at the hearing, or both....
(B) The court shall consider the victim's statement along with other factors that the
court is required to consider in imposing sentence. If the statement includes new
material facts upon which the court intends to rely, the court shall continue the
sentencing proceeding or take other appropriate action to allow the defendant an
adequate opportunity to respond to the new material facts.
Id.
9 Id. § 2930.14(A).
10 Sentence can be imposed by a panel of three judges that tried the offender if the
defendant waived the right to trial by jury or by the trial jury and the trial judge if the
defendant was tried by a jury. Id. § 2929.03(C)(2)(a)-(b).
11 Id. § 2929.03(C)(2). The defendant must first be found guilty of both the charge and
one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in § 2929.04(A) of the Ohio
Revised Code (hereinafter O.R.C.). Id. The list of aggravating circumstances in O.R.C.
§ 2929.04(A) are as follows:
(1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States or
person in line of succession to the presidency, or of the governor or lieutenant governor
of this state, or of the president-elect or vice president-elect of the United States, or of
the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or of a candidate for any of
the foregoing offices....
(2) The offense was committed for hire.
(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection,
apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.
(4) The offense was committed while the offender was a prisoner in a detention
facility....
(5) Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an essential
element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, or the offense
at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to
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jurors, especially when spoken or written by articulate, persuasive
individuals. 12 These serious effects are exacerbated when the trial jury has been
exposed to grotesque evidence and is subsequently seated as the sentencing
jury. 13 Despite these serious effects, the Victims' Rights Act won approval by
the Ohio General Assembly. 14 With the passage of the Victims' Rights Act
came uncertainty as to whether VISs were admissible in Ohio capital offense
sentencing hearings. The uncertainty arose because the Victims' Rights Act
repealed prior legislation excepting VISs from capital offense sentencing
hearings but the new Act never explicitly allowed VISs in capital offense
kill two or more persons by the offender.
(6) The victim of the offense was a peace officer. . . whom the offender had
reasonable cause to know or knew to be such, and either the victim, at the time of the
commission of the offense, was engaged in his duties, or it was the offender's specific
purpose to kill a peace officer.
(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to
commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping,
rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the
offender was the principal offender in the commmission of the aggravated murder or, if
not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and
design.
(8) The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who was
purposely killed to prevent his testimony in any criminal proceeding and the aggravated
murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commission, or flight
immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the
victim was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an
offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for his testimony in any criminal
proceeding.
Id. § 2929.04(A). The trial jury, if the defendant was tried by a jury, must then
unanimously find, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case. Id. § 2929.03(D)(2). If so, the jury will
recommend to the court that the defendant receive the death sentence. Id. If the aggravating
circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case, the trial jury will
recommend life imprisonment with parole eligibility after either twenty or thirty full years
of imprisonment. Id.
12 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 505 (1987), overmded by Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808 (1991). In Booth, the Court stated that while one victim's family members
may be articulate and persuasive in expressing their loss, other victims may leave behind no
family or family members who are less able to express their loss in such eloquent terms. Id.
The fact that a jury may decide to impose death due to the persuasiveness of a victim's
family illustrates the dangers of VISs in the sentencing phase of capital offense cases. Id.
13 OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03(C)(2)(b) (Baldwin 1994); see supra text
accompanying note 10.
14 See infra note 19.
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sentencing hearings. Instead, the Victims' Rights Act was silent on this specific
issue.
This Note covers four areas surrounding the VIS controversy. Part II
discusses the history of the Victims' Rights Act. It discusses the enactment,
amendment, and repeal of Ohio statutes which form the core and track the
cause of the current statutory uncertainty. Part III provides a historical judicial
context within which the Victims' Rights Act must be viewed. This Part
provides judicial context by concentrating on three U.S. Supreme Court
decisions essential to an understanding of the law surrounding VISs. These
decisions are: Booth v. Maryland,15 South Carolina v. Gathers,16 and Payne v.
Tennessee.17 Part IV provides arguments for and against allowing VISs during
the sentencing phase of capital offense cases.' 8 Finally, Part V discusses my
conclusions as to how Ohio law should be interpreted.
]I. HISTORY AND CONTROVERY OF AMENDED SuBsTrrutE
SENATE BILL 186
In response to the rise in victims' rights awareness, Ohio passed the
Victims' Rights Act. 19 This Act amended current victims' rights law, repealed
other sections of the Ohio Revised Code (hereinafter O.R.C.) which codified
victims' rights, and enacted new sections on victims' rights to the O.R.C.20
Those sections repealed by the Victims' Rights Act comprise the core of the
Ohio controversy. Specifically, the Victims' Rights Act repealed O.R.C.
sections 2943.041 and 2945.07.21 These two sections excepted capital offense
cases from sentencing hearings in which a VIS could be read, but allowed VISs
in other sentencing hearings.22 With these two sections repealed, the capital
15 482 U.S. 496 (1987), ovemded by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
16 490 U.S. 805 (1989), ovemded by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
17 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
18 For a discussion of arguments against admitting VISs in capital offense sentencing
hearings, see infra part V.A. For a discussion of arguments in support of admitting VISs in
capital offense sentencing hearings, see infra part IV.B.
19 See S. 186, 120th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1994). The Victims' Rights Act
was passed on May 26, 1994 and approved on July 13, 1994. Its effective date was October
12, 1994.
20Id.
21 Id. see. 2.
2 2 OHO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2943.041, 2945.07 (Baldwin 1993) (repealed 1994). Both
sections stated that a victim impact statement was permitted in the following cases:
[Tihe indictment or count in the indictment does not contain one or more specifications
of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised
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offense exception arguably no longer existed since the General Assembly did
not include any similar exception in the Victims' Rights Act.
However, the General Assembly did not specifically include capital offense
sentencing juries as proper audiences for VISs. Notwithstanding this omission,
O.R.C. section 2930.14(B) states that "[t]he court shall consider the victim's
statement" before imposing sentence.23 Further, the language of O.R.C.
section 2930.14(B) indicates that the judge, not the jury, should receive victim
impact evidence.24 Because sentencing juries would receive victim impact
evidence in capital offense sentencing hearings, a practice apparently prohibited
by the language of O.R.C. section 2930.14(B), admitting VISs may be
improper in light of the recent amendments. Given the attention and recent
focus on the arguments surrounding VISs, 25 it is unlikely that the General
Assembly merely overlooked the issue of VISs in capital offense cases. A more
plausible interpretation is that the General Assembly was not explicit enough in
its decision to affirmatively admit such evidence.
III. COMMON LAW HISTORY OF VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
A. U.S. Supreme Court Opposes Victim Impact Statements at Capital
Offense Hearings
The history of VISs during the sentencing phase of capital offenses has
been uncertain and controversial. The U.S. Supreme Court has done little to
alleviate the uncertainty surrounding VISs. To the contrary, the Court handed
down three different decisions within four years on the status of VISs.26
Code... or a violation of an existing or former municipal ordinance or law of this or
any other state or the United States in situations in which the violation is substantially
equivalent to any of those violations ....
Id. (emphasis added). Division (A) of § 2929.04 of the O.R.C. lists the aggravating
circumstances of which one or more must be specified in the indictment and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt before a sentencing jury can recommend, or ajudge impose, the death
sentence for a capital offense. Id. § 2929.04. See supra note 11 for the list of aggravating
circumstances.
23 OHIO RLeV. CODE ANN. § 2930.14(B) (Baldwin 1994) (emphasis added); see supra
note 8.
24 OHIOREV. CODE ANN. § 2930.14(B) (Baldwin 1994).
25 "[T7hat a crime's unanticipated consequences must be deemed 'irrelevant' to the
sentence conflicts with a public sense of justice keen enough that it has found voice in a
nationwide 'victim's rights' movement." Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 834 (1991).
26 Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overruled by Payne v.
1996]
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The first of these three pivotal decisions, Booth v. Maryland,2 7 held that
allowing a VIS at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial violated the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 28 The
defendant in Booth robbed and murdered an elderly couple.29 The defendant
was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of robbery,
and one count of conspiracy to commit robbery. 30 Defendant Booth chose to
have his sentence determined by the trial jury instead of the judge.31 Before
sentencing, a presentence investigation report was completed on Booth. 32 In
compliance with a Maryland statute, a VIS was included in the presentence
investigation report.33 The VIS described the severe emotional impact the
crimes had on the victims' family and the personal characteristics of the
victims.3 4 The VIS also stated the family members' opinions of the crimes and
of the defendant.3 5 For instance, the victims' son stated that he "suffers from
lack of sleep and depression, and is 'fearful for the first time in his life.'" 36 He
also stated that his parents were "'butchered like animals.'" 3 7
In deciding that a VIS was unconstitutional in capital offense sentencing-
and after considering the above information in Booth's VIS-the Court stated
that a VIS interfered with the jury's ability to make an "'individualized
determination'" of whether the defendant should be executed.38 The law
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991). For a more
extensive discussion of Booth, Gathers, and Payne, see Michael L Oberlander, Note, The
Payne of Allowing Viaim Inpact Statements at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 45 VAND. L.
REV. 1621, 1633-44 (1992); Steven P. Smith, Note, Unreliable and Prejudicial: The Use of
Extraneous Unadjudicated Offenses in the Penalty Phases of Capital Trials, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1249, 1256-57 (1993).
27 482 U.S. 496 (1987), overrded by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
28 Id. at 509. The Eighth Amendment reads: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.




33 Id. The 1986 Maryland statute in relevant part read: "In any case in which the death
penalty is requested... a presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement,
shall be completed by the Division of Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the
court or jury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted . " MD.
CODE ANN., ExEc. DEP'T § 4-609(d) (1986).
34 Booth, 482 U.S. at 502.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 499-500.
37 Id. at 500.
38 Id. at 502 (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)) (emphasis omitted).
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required that a determination be based on "the character of the individual and
the circumstances of the crime." 39 This determination was jeopardized when
victim impact evidence was admitted, because it had the potential of focusing
the jury's attention on matters outside the defendant's character and
circumstances of the crime.40 In other words, the jury's attention might be
focused on matters extraneous to the "blameworthiness" of the defendant.41
For example, often the defendant does not know the victim.42 The defendant,
therefore, does not know of any consequences to the victim's family and should
not be sentenced to death based on factors irrelevant to the decision to kill.4 3 A
jury's discretion to impose the death sentence must be "directed and limited so
as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action." 44 Only then
can a death sentence be within the bounds of the Constitution and the Eighth
Amendment. The victim impact information in Booth, however, tended to
inflame the jury and divert the jury's attention to the victims and their families
rather than concentrate on the crime and the defendant. 45 Due to this tendency
to incite the jury by recounting the grief of the victims, the jury was unable to
make an individualized determination of whether the defendant should be
executed for his capital offense.46 The Booth Court also expressed concern that
a sentencing jury would recommend death based on the perceived worth of the
victim.47 Victim impact evidence often contains information about the personal
3 9 Id. (quoting Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879 (1983)).




44Id. at 502 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976)). Gregg
incorporated the mandates of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam), into
its death penalty statute so as to pass constitutional scrutiny. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 199, 207.
Fumian struck down Georgia's death penalty statute and effectively invalidated death
penalty statutes throughout the United States. Fumnan, 408 U.S. at 411 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). In Furman, Justice Stewart stated that, though not per se unconstitutional, a
death sentence could be handed down in such a manner that makes it unconstitutional. He
likened arbitrary and capricious death sentence decisions to being struck by lightning. Id. at
309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring). Of all the susceptible individuals, only a random handful
are selected. Id. This makes being struck by lightning and arbitrary and capricious death
sentences both cruel and unusual. Fwman mandated that state capital sentencing procedures
be based upon reliable standards that use rational and objective criteria to distinguish
between defendants who deserve the death penalty and those who do not. Smith, supra note
26, at 1252-53; see Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 874 (1983).
45 Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
46 See id. at 508-09.
47 See id. at 506-07.
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qualities of the victim. 48 The Court did not want death imposed more often
when the victim was an upstanding member of the community rather than
"someone of questionable character." 49 Based on the above reasons, the Court
found that the introduction of VISs at the sentencing phase of a capital murder
trial violated the Eighth Amendment.50
In 1989, the U.S. Supreme Court, in South Carolina v. Gathers,51
expanded its prohibition of VISs to statements by prosecutors regarding the
personal qualifies of victims.52 The prosecutor in Gathers read from a religious
tract the victim was carrying at the time of his death.53 The prosecutor also
commented on the personal qualities of the victim, which were inferred from
the items found at the murder scene.54 The prosecutor then conveyed the
suggestion that the defendant deserved the death penalty because he took the
life of a religious man and registered voter. 55 Stating that VISs held the same
constitutional problems when presented by prosecutors as when presented by a
victim's family members, the Court held that victim impact evidence remained
unconstitutional. 56 Victim impact evidence maintained this status until 1991
when the Court overruled itself in Payne v. Tennessee.57
B. Current Status of Victim Impact Statements Under Payne v.
Tennessee
The current status of the law was first articulated in Payne v. Tennessee.58
48 See id. The Court discussed the procedural consequences of admitting victim impact
evidence. Id. at 507. In some cases the defendant would be permitted to "put on evidence
that the victim was of dubious moral character, was unpopular, or was ostracized from his
family." Id. The Court described this as an unappealing "'mini-trial' on the victim's
character." Id. The Court stated: "We are troubled by the implication that defendants whose
victims were assets to their community are more deserving of punishment than those whose
victims are perceived to be less worthy. Of course, our system of justice does not tolerate
such distinctions." Id. at 506 n.8.
49 Id. at 506.
50Id. at 509.
51 490 U.S. 805 (1989), overmded by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
52 Id. at 811.
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 810. The victim in Gather was also unemployed, experienced mental
problems, and referred to himself as "Reverend Minister" although he had no formal
religious training. Id. at 807.
56 Id. at 811-12.
57 501 U.S. 808, 830 (1991).
58 Id. at 827.
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Defendant Payne was convicted by a Tennessee jury on two counts of first-
degree murder and one count of assault with intent to commit murder in the
first degree.59 Payne was sentenced to death for each of the murders and to
thirty years in prison for the assault.60 The facts of the case detailed an
unprovoked, heinous act of violence on defendant Payne's part.61 Despite the
overwhelming evidence against Payne, he proclaimed his innocence at trial.6 2
During the sentencing phase of the trial, Payne presented the testimonies of
four witnesses: his mother and father, his girlfriend, and a clinical psychologist
specializing in criminal court evaluation work.63 Their testimonies were
intended to mitigate against Payne receiving the death penalty.64 The first three
witnesses testified as to Payne's good character and his good relationship with
children.65 The psychologist testified that Payne was "mentally handicapped"
based on a low IQ test score but was neither psychotic nor schizophrenic. 66
Despite the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier rulings in Booth and Gathers, the
trial court allowed a relative of the victims, Mary Zvolanek, to testify at the
sentencing hearing.67 Zvolanek briefly described how her grandson Nicholas,
the young survivor of the attack, was affected by the murders of his mother and
younger sister. 68 In arguing for the death penalty during closing arguments, the
prosecutor extensively commented on the continuing effects of Nicholas's
experience. 69
In its decision to abandon the rationale in Booth and Gathers, the U.S.
59 Id. at 811. The charges were based on an attack on a mother and her two
children. Id. The mother and her daughter were killed, but the son survived. Id.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 811-13.
62 Id. at 813-14. Payne asserted that another man raced past him as he was walking up
the stairs to his girlfriend's apartment. Id. at 813. The victims lived across the hall from
Payne's girlfriend. Id. at 811. Payne stated that he got blood on himself when he tried to
help the victims. l at 813. He then stated that when he heard sirens, he panicked and fled
the scene. Id. at 811, 813-14.
63 Id. at 814.
64 Id. at 825-27.
65 Id. at 814.
6 6 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 814-15.
69 ld. at 815. Especially interesting was the tactic the prosecutor used to counter the
cruel and unusual argument against the death penalty. See supra text accompanying note 44.
The prosecutor stated: "You saw the videotape this morning. You saw what Nicholas
Christopher will carry in his mind forever. When you talk about cruel, when you talk about
atrocious, and when you talk about heinous, that picture will always come into your mind,
probably throughout the rest of your lives." Payne, 501 U.S. at 815-16.
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Supreme Court took a different approach to the "blameworthiness of a
defendant" standard which prevented earlier Courts from allowing VISs. The
Payne Court pointed out that "two equally blameworthy criminal defendants
may be guilty of different offenses solely because their acts cause differing
amounts of harm." 70 Therefore, the Court determined that the amount of harm
caused was a crucial ingredient in determining the appropriate punishment.71
The Court also discussed the importance of conducting an inquiry that was
broad in scope.72 It expressed agreement with earlier case law that a jury
should have as much information as possible before making a sentencing
decision.73 The Court concluded that this broad scope included VISs. 74
One of the Court's strongest arguments, however, was based upon
balancing. In an earlier decision, the Court noted that a state could not prevent
a sentencing jury from considering "relevant mitigating evidence" that a
defentlant offered in support of a sentence other than death. 75 This advanced
the notion, relied on in Booth, that defendants should be treated as individuals
with their own set of mitigating factors. However, being treated as an
individual, the Court noted, did not imply that a defendant must be considered
apart from the crime and the harm he committed. 76 The Court stated that it was
this principle which the Booth Court erroneously applied. 77 Through the Booth
interpretation, the scales of justice were unfairly weighted in favor of the
70 Payne, 501 U.S. at 819. The example the Court gave was: "'If a bank robber aims
his gun at a guard, pulls the trigger, and kills his target, he may be put to death. If the gun
unexpectedly misfires, he may not. His moral guilt in both cases is identical, but his
responsibility in the former is greater.'" Id. at 819 (quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S.
496, 519 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808
(1991)). In her dissenting opinion in Gathers, Justice O'Connor noted that no state
authorizes the death penalty for attempted murder, though a defendant convicted of
attempted murder has the same mental state as an actual killer. South Carolina v. Gathers,
490 U.S. 805, 819 (1989) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991). The only difference between the two crimes is the harm to the
community. Id.
71 Payne, 501 U.S. at 819.
72 Id. at 820-21.
73 Id at 821. The Court agreed with the holding of Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
203-04 (1976), which upheld Georgia's lack of restrictions on evidence at presentence
hearings. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 203. The Gregg Court thought it was wise to allow open and
far-ranging argument so that the jury could have as much information as possible when
making the sentencing decision. Id. at 203-04.
74 See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
75 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 113-14 (1982).
7 6 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
77 Id.
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defendant. 78 While minimal limitations were placed on a defendant's right to
present relevant mitigating evidence,79 the state was prohibited from showing
the consequences of a defendant's act.80 This relevant mitigating evidence
could include a defendant's family or friends testifying as to a defendant's good
character, position in the community, or role in the family unit.81 This type of
evidence is similar to evidence brought by a victim's family describing the
victim's character, position in the community, role in the family unit, and in
what ways the victim will be missed. Both are equally relevant or irrelevant.
Since one is admissible, the Court reasoned that the other should be admissible
as well. 82
In response to the Booth Court's concern as to whether sentences would be
imposed according to the community fitness of the victim, the Court stated that
the purpose of VISs was not for comparative judgements.83 Instead, just as
78 Id.
79 O.R.C. § 2929.03 discusses mitigating circumstances. In relevant part it states:
"The defendant shall be given great latitude in the presentation of evidence of the mitigating
factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code and of any other
factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death." OrHO REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2929.03(D)(1) (Baldwin 1994). The mitigating factors of O.R.C. § 2929.04(B) include the
following:
(B) mhe nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and
background of the offender, and all of the following factors:
(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;
(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the
fact that the offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;
(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a
mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law;
(4) The youth of the offender;,
(5) The offender's lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and
delinquency adjudications;
(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender,
the degree of the offender's participation in the offense and the degree of the offender's
participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim;
(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should
be sentenced to death.
Id. § 2929.04(B).
80 Payne, 501 U.S. at 822.
81 See id. at 814.
82 Id. at 826 (citing State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 19 (Tenn. 1990), aff'd, Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991)).
83 Id. at 823.
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each defendant must be treated as a unique individual, each victim should be
treated as a unique individual. 84 For example, even though the victim in
Gathers was both unemployed and experiencing mental problems at the time of
his death, his murderer was originally sentenced to death. 85 This illustrates that
the place a victim holds in society is not always determinative as to whether a
defendant will receive the death penalty. The Payne Court held that if a state
chose to admit victim impact evidence, the Eighth Amendment erected no per
se bar to its admission. 86 The Court then extended its decision by allowing
prosecutorial argument on victim impact evidence, thereby overruling
Gathers.87
IV. INTERPRETATIONS OF THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS ACT
A. Victim Impact Statements Prohibited by Ohio Law
Opponents to admitting VISs at capital offense sentencing hearings assert
that VISs are still prohibited by Ohio law. Specifically, these opponents assert
that the recently enacted Victims' Rights Act does nothing to change prior law
as to whether VISs can be read to juries during sentencing of capital offenses.
This position is supported by three arguments: (1) current law does not
specifically allow VISs;88 (2) the mandatory language of the Victims' Rights
Act conflicts with Rule 403 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence; 89 and (3) Payne
does not act as a barrier to prohibit victim impact evidence. 90
1. Current Law Does Not Specifically Allow VISs
The first argument against admitting VISs at capital offense sentencing
hearings is that current law does not specifically allow VISs at capital
sentencing hearings.91 Although the statutes containing capital sentencing
exceptions to VISs were repealed, 92 nowhere does the Victims' Rights Act
84 See id.
85 South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 806 (1989). This sentence was then
reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court and the case was remanded fur a new sentencing
hearing. Id. at 805.86 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827.
87 Id. at 830.
88 For further discussion, see infra part IV.A.1.
89 For further discussion, see infra part IV.A.2.
90 For further discussion, see infra part IV.A.3.
91 See OmO RL:v. CODE ANN. § 2930.14 (Baldwin 1994).
92 Id. §§ 2943.041, 2945.07 (Baldwin 1993) (repealed 1994).
[Vol. 57:235
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
specifically allow VISs to be read during capital sentencing hearings. 93 This
omission of the exception could mean that the General Assembly did not intend
VISs to be read during the sentencing of capital offenses. However, the
General Assembly simply may have overlooked including the exception in the
new legislation. Although unlikely, the proposition that the exception was
inadvertently omitted is strengthened by a close reading of the Victims' Rights
Act.
O.R.C. section 2930.14, a newly enacted statute through the Victims'
Rights Act,94 refers solely to "victims"-not to victims' family members95-
making a statement concerning the crime. On the surface, two interpretations of
this language seem to warrant the use of VISs during the sentencing of capital
offenses without offending the language of O.R.C. section 2930.14. However,
closer scrutiny of these two interpretations show that a capital offense victim
was never the intended beneficiary of this legislation. In the first interpretation,
the victim could physically deliver the statement either in writing or orally at
the actual hearing.96 However, this would be impossible in the case of capital
offense sentencing hearings as the victim is deceased. In the second
interpretation, the victim referred to in O.R.C. section 2930.14 could also, by
definition, include a victim's representative. 97 This would allow the victim's
representative to present the VIS to the court and, arguably, to a sentencing
jury. The victim's representative could be a family member or any other person
who wishes to exercise the rights of the victim. 98 A VIS at a capital sentencing
hearing will often contain the statements of several individuals; and be
presented by a single victim's representative. 99 Although a victim's
representative could incorporate the statements of other family members in her
single VIS, such a compilation would not comply with O.R.C.
93 See id. § 2930.14 (Baldwin 1994).
94 Ld.
95 Id. § 2930.14(A); see supra note 8.
96 OmIoREV. CODE ANN. § 2930.14(A) (Baldwin 1994).
97 Id. § 2930.02(A)(1). This section states:
(A)(1) A member of a victim's family or another person may exercise the rights of the
victim under this chapter as the victim's representative if either of the following applies:
(a) The victim is a minor or is incapacitated, incompetent, or deceased.
Id. This section also specifies that all references to a victim under chapter 29 shall be
interpreted as references to a victim's representative if one is so appointed. Id.
§ 2930.02(B).
98 Id. § 2930.02(AX1).
99 Id. § 2930.02(A)(2). If more than one individual wishes to be the victim's
representative, the court may designate one person to fulfill that charge. Id.
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section 2930.14(A). 100 O.R.C. section 2930.14(A) allows a "statement
concerning the effects of the crime upon the victim ... ."10 Although this
could be expanded to include the effects of the crime upon the victim's
representative (because a victim's representative stands in the shoes of the
victim), it could not be expanded to include other family members or
friends. 102 Because the effects of a crime upon various family members and
friends is not statutorily permitted in the VIS, and the capital offense VIS
contains such impermissible effects, it is arguable that the General Assembly
did not intend to allow VISs at capital sentencing hearings.
2. The Mandatory Language of the Vicims Rights Act Conflicts with
Rule 403 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence
The second argument against admitting VISs at capital sentencing hearings
is that the mandatory language of the Victims' Rights Act could be read to
conflict with Rule 403 of the Ohio Rules of Evidence. O.R.C. section
2930.14(A) states: "Before imposing sentence upon the defendant for the
commission of a crime, the court shall permit the victim of the crime to make a
statement .... "103 This wording makes it mandatory for a court to permit
victim impact evidence if the victim or victim's representative desires to present
it at the sentencing hearing. This causes a potential conflict with the Ohio Rules
of Evidence. Rule 403(A) states: "Although relevant, evidence is not
admissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, of confusion of the issues, or of misleading the jury." °4
Although the Payne Court held that VISs were not per se unconstitutional, 105 it
did not hold that such evidence was always admissible, regardless of any
prejudicial effect. If the General Assembly in enacting O.R.C. section 2930.14
intended to admit all VISs during capital sentencing, the rules of evidence may
be usurped. Practically, this would not be a problem in any sentencing
procedure other than a capital sentencing procedure because the judge is wholly
responsible for the defendant's sentence. Due to experience, the judge would
not allow the VIS to unfairly prejudice his or her decision. However, this is not
the situation in sentencing hearings with death specifications. When a case has
death specifications, a sentencing jury will recommend either life imprisonment
100 Id. § 2930.14(A); see supra notes 8 and 99.
101 Omo RLv. CODE ANN. § 2930.14(A) (Baldwin 1994) (emphasis added).
102 See id. § 2930.02(B).
103 Id. § 2930.14(A) (emphasis added); see supra note 8.
104 OmoR. EviD. 403(A).
105 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
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or death, but the judge will impose the actual sentence. 6 Although a judge
can override the jury's recommendation to impose the death penalty, 107 the
jury's recommendation has a strong impact on a judge's decision. Because of
this impact, it is important that the jury not be improperly prejudiced. It may
be implicitly understood, however, that Rule 403 will be weighed into the
decision of whether to admit this or any type of evidence. If Rule 403 is an
automatic prerequisite to admitting a VIS, there is no conflict. Though not
definite, this may be the best interpretation of the interplay between the
Victims' Rights Act and Rule 403.
3. Payne Does Not Act as a Barrier to Prohibiting Victim Impact
Evidence
The third argument against admitting VISs at capital sentencing hearings is
that if O.R.C. section 2930.14 is interpreted so as to exclude VISs during
capital sentencing, Payne does not mandate their admission. The holding of
Payne stated "that if the State chooses to permit the admission of victim impact
evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment
erects no per se bar."108 Therefore, the state must first decide to allow victim
impact evidence before Payne even applies. If the state statutorily decides not
to allow this evidence, Payne never needs to be invoked. Whether VISs are
constitutional or not would be a moot question. Thus, if VISs are prohibited by
statute, they should be inadmissible for that reason alone.109
106 See supra note 11.
107 Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2929.03(D)(3) (Baldwin 1994). If, after the trial jury's
recommendation of the death sentence, the court finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, the court shall impose
the death sentence on the defendant. Id. If the court does not find that the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors, the court will impose a life imprisonment
sentence with parole eligibility after either twenty or thirty fall years of imprisonment. Id.
See supra text accompanying note 11 for the list of aggravating circumstances.108 Payne, 501 U.S. at 827 (first emphasis added).
109 Ohio Rule of Evidence 402, in relevant part, states:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio, by statute enacted by the
General Assembly not in conflict with a rule of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these
rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
Omo R. EVID. 402.
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B. Victim Impact Statements Permitted by Ohio Statute
Though several factors suggest that VISs are still prohibited by Ohio
statute, there are equally strong, if not stronger, reasons to believe that VISs
are now permitted during the sentencing phase of capital offenses. These
reasons include: (1) the repeal of O.R.C. sections 2943.041 and 2945.07
indicates that capital sentencing hearings are no longer excepted from admitting
VISs; 110 and (2) because the Ohio Supreme Court cited Payne as support for
admitting VISs in capital sentencing hearings, Ohio has decided to adopt the
rationale of Payne and allow VISs in capital sentencing hearings. 111
1. Capital Sentencing Hearings No Longer Excepted from
Admitting VISs
The first argument in support of admitting VISs in capital offense
sentencing hearings is found in the statutes the General Assembly chose to
repeal. The General Assembly repealed O.R.C. sections 2943.041 and
2945.07.112 O.R.C. section 2943.041 set forth the rights of crime victims in
regard to the prosecution of defendants.1 13 O.R.C. section 2945.07 discussed
the determination of whether the crime victim or a member of the victim's
family were actually present at trial, the recording of that presence, and notices
which had to be given to either the victim or the victim's representative family
member.1 14 Both sections allowed the victim or the victim's representative
family member to make a statement regarding the victimization and the
sentencing of the offender.1 15 These sections applied only when an "indictment
or count in the indictment d[id] not contain one or more specifications of
aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the
Revised Code ..... 116 Specifications of aggravating circumstances in an
indictment are necessary in a capital offense trial in order to have the option of
imposing the death penalty.117 Therefore, when the General Assembly repealed
these statutes, it also repealed the exceptions to admitting VISs at capital
sentencing hearings. The legislature then chose not to adopt any exceptions,
110 For further discussion, see infra part WV.B.1.
111 For further discussion, see infra part IV.B.2.
112 OHIoRwV. CODE ANN. §§ 2943.041, 2945.07 (Baldwin 1993) (repealed 1994).
113 l. § 2945.041 (repealed 1994).
114 Id. § 2945.07 (repealed 1994).
115 Id. §§ 2943.041, 2945.07 (repealed 1994).
116 Id. (both sections using identical language).
117 See id. § 2929.03(A).
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including capital sentencing hearings, in the Victims' Rights Act. 118 This
would lead to the conclusion that the Ohio General Assembly intended to repeal
the exceptions to reading VISs in capital sentencing hearings. Proponents of
admitting VISs in capital offense sentencing hearings assert that for the capital
sentencing exception to still exist, the General Assembly could not have known
about the capital sentencing exceptions in repealed O.R.C. sections 2943.041
and 2945.07. However, this is an unlikely explanation for such a controversial
issue as victim impact evidence.119
2. Adopting the Rationale of Payne in Ohio Courts
The second argument in support of admitting VISs in capital offense
sentencing hearings is that Ohio courts have been admitting VISs in capital
offense cases since Payne was decided. O.R.C. sections 2943.041 and 2945.07
were both repealed under the Victims' Rights Act in July 1994.120 However,
after the decision in Payne was handed down in June of 1991, the Ohio
Supreme Court admitted victim impact evidence under the authority of
Payne.121 This was done in spite of the fact that O.R.C. sections 2943.041 and
2945.07 were still in effect. These sections were effective from June 10,
1987,122 until the effective date of the Victims' Rights Act, October 12,
1994.123
The Ohio Supreme Court's first decision allowing victim impact evidence
is found in State v. Combs.124 The defendant in Combs was convicted of two
counts of aggravated murder and sentenced to death. 125 When arguing for the
imposition of the death penalty, the prosecutor speculated as to what the two
victims contemplated as they were about to be killed. 126 The prosecutor
speculated that the victims thought about how their surviving family members
were going to deal with their deaths. 127 By using Payne as precedent, the
118 See S. 186, 120th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1994).
119 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
120 See S. 186, 120th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. see. 2 (1994); see supra note 20.
121 After the decision in Payne, but before the effective date of the Act, victim impact
evidence was admitted in the following Ohio Supreme Court cases: State v. Lorraine, 613
N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1993); State v. Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 (Ohio 1991) (per curiam);
State v. Combs, 581 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio 1991).122 Qino RLv. CODE ANN. §§ 2943.041, 2945.07 (Baldwin 1993) (repealed 1994).
123 S. 186, 120th General Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1994).
124 581 N.E.2d 1071 (Ohio 1991).
125 Id. at 1075.
126 Id at 1076-77.
127 Id. at 1076. The prosecutor stated:
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Combs court stated that "the mention of the victims' personal situations and
their relatives did not violate the Constitution." 128 However, this case did not
contain the kind of emotional outrage that is so often connected with VISs. The
prosecutor was simply speculating as to what was in the victims' minds. There
were no heart-wrenching accounts given by family members. The latter type of
evidence is at the center of the victim impact evidence controversy, for it is the
kind of evidence with the greatest prejudicial potential against defendants.
State v. Evans129 reaffirmed Ohio's judicial position on victim impact
evidence. 130 The defendant in Evans was sentenced to death for aggravated
murder, attempted murder, and aggravated robbery. 131 Defendant Evans
asserted that the prosecutor's closing remarks were, in effect, victim impact
evidence. 132 These remarks, however, were given during the guilt phase of the
trial, not the sentencing phase. 133 As a result, the court held that the
prosecutor's comments were merely a "recitation of the facts brought out
during the trial, and thus not a victim-impact statement." 134 In dicta, the court
stated that even if the comments were considered a VIS, they would not
necessarily be inadmissible under the authority of Payne.135 Again, the Ohio
Supreme Court avoided the issue of admitting controversial victim impact
evidence during sentencing. In Evans, the evidence was not considered a
V'S.136
In its most recent decision addressing VISs in Ohio capital offense
sentencing hearings, the Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Lorraine137 again
"A gun right to your head, was she [Joan] thinking of her husband, who was going to
take care of him? .... What went through her [Peggy's] mind, what was she thinking?
Was she thinidng of little Joey, who's going to take care of him, grandma is gone, I'm
going to be gone, who's going to raise my little boy."
Id.
128 Id. at 1077.
129 586 N.E.2d 1042 (Ohio 1991).
130 See id. at 1050.
131 Id. at 1048-49.
132 Ld. at 1050. The prosecutor stated: "'Mhe poignant aspect, when you stop to think
about it, a young man watching his mother murdered with 22 stab wounds and crawling
under the bed and coming out when the police officers found him saying, "Don't shoot. I'm





137 613 N.E.2d 212 (Ohio 1993).
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upheld the admissibility of victim impact evidence. 138 The defendant in
Lorraine alleged that the trial court improperly admitted victim impact evidence
during both the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial. 139 This evidence
consisted of information as to the victims' advanced age, length of marriage,
physical weaknesses, and suffering. 14 Other information on individual victims
was also admitted. 141 In rejecting allegations that the evidence was victim
impact evidence, the court stated, "[flor the most part, this evidence illustrated
the nature and circumstances of the crimes, since the physical condition and
circumstances of the victims are relevant to the crime as a whole." 142 The
defendant also alleged that the VIS would cause the jury to empathize with the
victim.1 43 The court, however, stated that in comparison with the defendant's
own description of the brutal murders which was read to the jury, the VIS
would not be prejudicial. 144 The court cited Payne and Combs as supporting
authority to admit this type of victim impact evidence. 145
138 Id. at 218-19.
139 Id. at 218.
140 Id.
14 1 Id. The mental alertness of one victim was admitted as well as the lack of clothing
on another victim when found. Id.142 Id.
143 Id. at 219.
144 Id. Defendant Lorraine's statement-which was read to the jury-was as follows:
"I knocked on the door, and Doris waved for me to come inside. The door was
unlocked, and I went in. Doris was laying [sic] in bed because she is partially
paralyzed. Raymond was sitting on his bed which is in the dining room. I told Raymond
that I left my necklace upstairs, and he went upstairs with me to look. When we got
upstairs, Raymond was in front of me, and I took out the butcher knife from the back of
my jeans, and I stabbed Raymond three times in the throat and chest. Raymond was
gasping, and then he fell to the floor. I then went back down to the living room where
Doris was in bed.
I stood behind Doris, and then I stabbed her about three times in the throat and
chest. After I killed Doris, Perry [Postlethwaite] came up from the basement Perry
went upstairs and got Raymond's money from his wallet and came back down. I found
about $83.00 in Doris' sewing basket. Perry then went through a dresser and found a
silver ring with diamonds. We then left and got into the stolen Cadillac and drove
away."
l at 215. The court further stated: "According to the statement, after the murders
appellant [Lorraine] met friends at a local bar and bought them drinks with money taken
from the victims. Appellant also stated that before he murdered the victims, he had
burglarized another house in order to steal car keys and a car." Id.
145 Id.
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A common thread runs through all three of the Ohio Supreme Court
decisions. None of the decisions admit victim impact evidence without
somehow qualifying that admission. Combs did not deal with actual testimony
by the victim's family members. It was pure speculation on the part of the
prosecutor, of which the jury was fully aware. 146 Evans dealt with evidence
admitted during the guilt phase of the trial, not during sentencing. 147 Finally,
the evidence in Lorraine dealt mostly with the "nature and circumstances of the
crimes," not with the impact the murders had on family members. 148 Even
Booth would admit such information. 149 The Booth Court stated that the
circumstances of a crime were permissible sentencing considerations. 150 Since
the evidence in Lorraine was considered a part of the circumstances of the
crime, the evidence would not offend Booth.
Each decision cited Payne as authority for admitting the VIS.151 In all
three decisions, however, the Ohio Supreme Court never dealt with the
statutory issues involved in admitting this evidence even though O.R.C.
sections 2943.041 and 2945.07 were in effect at the time. The court
concentrated on constitutional arguments. All appellant briefs were filed before
Payne was decided and while Booth was still precedent. 152 Therefore, all
appellants relied on Booth as precedent and did not argue the statutory
prohibitions against admitting VISs at capital sentencing. As a result, it is
uncertain how the Ohio Supreme Court would have decided these cases if such
statutory objections were raised.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Victims' Rights Act left the status of VISs uncertain in Ohio
capital sentencing hearings, it is likely that the General Assembly intended to
allow VISs at such hearings. 153 First, by repealing the exceptions for capital
146 See State v. Combs, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Ohio 1991).
147 See State v. Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1050 (Ohio 1991).
148 Lorraine, 613 N.E.2d at 218-19.
149 See Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 502 (1987), ovemded by Payne v.
Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
150 Id.
151 See Lorraine, 613 N.E.2d at 219; Evans, 586 N.E.2d at 1050; State v. Combs,
581 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Ohio 1991).
152 See Lorraine, 613 N.E.2d at 219. The court stated: "Appellant argues that the use
of similar victim-impact evidence in the penalty phase violated Booth v. Maryland.
However, Payne v. Tennessee overruled Booth after appellant's brief was filed." Id.
(citation omitted).
153 The Ohio General Assembly can decide this issue by passing a specific statute
on the subject. O.R.C. § 2930.19(D) states: "If there is a conflict between a provision in
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offense sentencing, 154 the General Assembly removed the statutory barrier to
admitting VISs at the capital sentencing phase. It was very clear that the repeal
of these sections, without including a similar exception in the Victims' Rights
Act, would place capital sentencing hearings on the same level as all other
sentencing hearings so far as VISs were concerned. This was done in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Payne v. Tennessee,155 which held that
VISs were not per se unconstitutional in capital offense sentencing hearings. 156
The Ohio Supreme Court gave the Payne decision great deference. The Ohio
high court, on three occasions, stated that VISs would be admissible in capital
sentencing hearings.15 7 The court held VISs were admissible to the contrary of
Ohio statutory law, though this argument was never pursued by defendants.
Given the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Payne, the Ohio Supreme
Court's treatment of VISs in capital offense sentencing hearings and the Ohio
legislature's inaction in positively resolving the VIS controversy, it seems that
the Victims' Rights Act simply brought statutory law up to date with what
Ohio courts were already doing, i.e., admitting VISs in capital offense
sentencing hearings.
this chapter and a specific statute governing the procedure in a capital case, the specific
statute supersedes the provision in this chapter." OHoREv. CODE ANN. § 2930.19 (Baldwin
1994).
154 Id. §§ 2943.041, 2945.07 (Baldwin 1993) (repealed 1994).
155 Payne was decided in 1991, while the Victims' Rights Act was enacted in 1994.
156 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991).
157 See Lorraine, 613 N.E.2d at 218-19; State v. Evans, 586 N.E.2d 1042, 1050
(Ohio 1991); State v. Combs, 581 N.E.2d 1071, 1077 (Ohio 1991). For analysis of cases,
see supra part LV.B.2.
1996]

